This paper generalizes Hotellings 1931 theory of nonrenewable resources to situations where resource pools and their users are distributed spatially. Extraction and transport costs are assumed to be linear in the rate of extraction, but utilization of each deposit may require a setup cost. While Her ndahls 1967 analysis of the socially optimal utilization of multiple deposits by a single user can be given a spatial reinterpretation, our contribution is to generalize his results further to the case where there are multiple users who are themselves spatially distributed. While our spatial generalization is important i n m a n y resource applications, it is essential to an understanding of solid waste problems. Land ll space may be regarded as a depletable resource, since space extracted today is unavailable tomorrow. But since cities and land lls are dispersed geographically, transshipment o f w aste commonly occurs within and between countries. Our analysis characterizes socially optimal waste ows over time and space and will facilitate the evaluation of the many g o v ernment i n terventions designed to regulate such shipments of solid waste.
Introduction
Although geographical dispersion is an important real-world consideration in most resource problems, spatial considerations have largely been ignored in the resource literature which originated with Hotelling's 1931 seminal contribution. Our purpose here is to remedy this situation by generalizing Hotelling's intertemporal theory of exhaustible resources to the case where both resource pools and users are spatially distributed.
One application of our analysis is to the intertemporal and spatial utilization of land lls. There is a strong similarity b e t w een land lls and conventional nonrenewable resources 1 . Like mineral deposits or oil pools, land lls are exhaustible resources: the size of a given land ll is nite and extracting" a unit of land ll space today irreversibly reduces the stock available for extraction tomorrow. In addition to being exhaustible resources, land lls also bring up particularly important spatial considerations. Transshipments of solid waste within di erent areas of one country as well as between countries occur frequently 2 . Unfortunately, regulations intended to control these ows have been formulated without the analytical framework necessary to evaluate their welfare e ects. The theoretical model developed here can be used to evaluate such regulations 3 .
Spatial considerations are, of course, also important in the case of more conventional exhaustible resources. Indeed, each of the previous, limited attempts to include spatial considerations in a resource model was motivated by a di erent application. La ont and Moreaux 1986 study the case of a continuum of deposits located along a line segment with a single market located at one end of the line segment. Their model was initially formulated to study the optimal extraction of gravel in the vicinity of the city of Bordeaux, where the market for this gravel is located. They take account of the fact that the land being mined for gravel cannot, once mined, continue to be exploited as vineyards. If we abstract from 1 This similarity has recently been noted and exploited by Chang and Schuler 1990 , Dunbar and Berkman 1991 and Ready and Ready 1995 this aspect of the problem and assume a discrete number of gravel deposits, then their model can be viewed as a direct reinterpretation of Her ndahl's 1967 analysis of extraction from multiple deposits with constant but di ering marginal costs. Her ndahl showed that mines should be exploited in the order of their marginal costs, with no extraction from a higher cost mine while any reserves remain in a mine of lower cost. If we assume that the cost of extraction is the same for all gravel deposits and that the constant cost of transporting a unit of gravel to Bordeaux increases with the distance to the city, then the Her ndahl principle simply states that they should be exploited in strict order of distance from the city starting with the closest. This conclusion would still be valid if the deposits were located anywhere in the plane rather than on a line segment as La ont and Moreaux assume. But the further generalization of their analysis to multiple users who are also distributed in the plane is far from obvious.
Kolstad 1994 advances the discussion by assuming multiple users, but he con nes attention to one tractable spatial con guration. In particular, he considers the case where a continuum of consumers are distributed uniformly along a line segment with a mineral deposit located at each end. At a n y point in time, these consumers are easily partitioned into two groups: those patronizing the mine at one end of the line segment and those patronizing the mine at the other end. He studies how the market shares of the two mines evolve over time so as to exhaust them. Unfortunately, i t i s b y no means clear how to generalize Kolstad's approach when customers and mines can each be located anywhere in the plane. For then it is extremely di cult to identify the set of customers patronizing any given mine at a particular time.
As in Her ndahl, La ont-Moreaux, and Kolstad, we examine the case where extraction requires no set-up cost. However, set-up costs are an important consideration in the case of land lls and other exhaustible resources. We therefore also extend our analysis to take account of such costs. The Her ndahl framework and principle have been extended in a nonspatial context to take account of set-up costs by Long 1984 and Hartwick, Kemp and Long 1986 4 . They show that one implication of set-up costs is that even if deposits are identical in all respects it is always optimal to deplete one completely before going on to the next deposit. However, if deposits di er in their set-up cost as well as in their marginal cost of extraction, they need not be exploited in the order of their marginal costs. It may be optimal, for example, to postpone depletion of the deposit with the lowest marginal cost of extraction if it has a high set-up cost relative to the other deposits. As they established, net marginal bene t will jump down whenever a new deposit is opened if its set-up cost is positive 5 .
Our model provides a number of theoretical insights into the intertemporal and spatial allocation of the scarce resource. We show that three basics principles must hold whether there are set-up costs or not and whether there are many spatially di erentiated sources of demand or just one. These principles dictate which land ll site a user should be using at any given time and how his usage should behave when he switches to a di erent site. In the one-city case with no set-up cost, they reduce to the usual Her ndahl principle. In the one-city case with set-up cost, they collapse to the results of Hartwick, Kemp and Long.
But when there are many spatially distributed cities, phenomena arise which cannot otherwise occur and hence at rst seem counterintuitive. For instance, even in the absence of set-up costs, it may be optimal for a city to abandon using a local site in favor of a more distant one even though space remains in the local site and it has the lower transport cost. When there are set-up costs, it may e v en be optimal for a user to abandon a site at some point and then return to it after an interval of time. We also nd a somewhat surprising comparative dynamics result which can occur with or without set-up costs: if the exogenous transport cost per unit of distance goes up, the shadow prices may increase at one land ll 4 Weitzman 1976 also proposed a method for solving the problem of minimizing the present discounted cost of supplying a xed ow of a depletable resource from many deposits, when the average cost of extraction from a deposit depends on how m uch has already been taken out of it. A positive set-up cost with constant marginal cost of extraction can be viewed as a special case of such a cost con guration. His method can in fact provide a generalization of the Her ndahl principle for arbitrary extraction costs and can be used to con rm the results of Hartwick, Kemp and Long. and decrease at another. This means that in a decentralized equilibrium, land ll prices may increase for some users and decrease for other users in response to an increase in the cost of transport.
In the next section, we describe the general problem when many users and many land lls are arbitrarily distributed in the plane. We discuss the optimality conditions which m ust hold while a land ll site is being used and whenever a new land ll site is set-up. In section 3, we apply these conditions to describe the optimal intertemporal and spatial allocation when there are no set-up costs. In section 4, we extend the discussion to the case with set-up costs. Section 5 explains why an increase in transport costs can cause some land ll prices to fall for some users while it rises for others. In section 6, we explain how the analysis we h a v e presented can be reinterpreted to take account of recycling, waste reduction, incineration, costly expansion of existing sites, and the choice of new sites. Section 7 suggests several extensions and concludes the paper.
2 The general problem: many cities and many land lls at arbitrary locations There are n land ll sites that can be used to dispose of the solid waste of m cities. These cities and land lls can be located anywhere in the plane. The cities can be considered as m di erent users of the nite volume of land ll space at each o f t h e n sites.
Assume that the marginal cost of transporting and dumping city k's waste in land ll i is constant and denote it c ik . F urther assume, to eliminate even the possibility of indeterminacies over time, that for any city n o t w o sites have the same marginal cost. The given initial volume of land ll space at site i is S 0 i 0 and its set-up cost is F i 0. We will denote by S i t the remaining volume of space at site i at time t and by q ik t 0 the space allocated to city k from land ll i at date t. The total amount of land ll space used by city k at date t is therefore q k t = P n i =1 q ik t and the total amount used by all cities of land ll i is q i t = P m k =1 q ik t. The total utility derived by city k from its land ll disposal activity at date t is U k q k t. Total utility is assumed to be an increasing, strictly concave function with U k 0 = 0 and U 0 k 0 nite. Let r denote the social rate of discount and i denote the date at which the set-up cost is incurred for site i. where J 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n is the optimal value of the program generated by P1. Given the stationarity of the exogenous functions, it is optimal to incur at least one set-up cost at date 0 as long as it is optimal ever to use some land ll. We will, without further loss of generality, assume 1 = 0. This of course does not exclude the possibility that i = 0 for one or more other i 6 = 1 .
The current v alue Hamiltonian associated with Problem P1 is:
c ik + i t q ik t : 3
It measures the total social value derived by all the cities from land ll usage at date t, net of all the associated costs, including the total imputed value of the land ll space being depleted. In addition, at the terminal date T, the following transversality conditions must hold:
Hj T = 0 6 i T S i T = 0 ; i T 0 ;S i T 0 ;i = 1 ; : : : ; n :
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The economic interpretation of these necessary conditions merits discussion. Condition 4 is necessary to maximize at each date the Hamiltonian associated with problem P1. I f city k is using land ll site i at date t, then condition 4 requires that the marginal utility derived from using site i must equal the full marginal cost of doing so. This full marginal cost" includes not only the costs of transporting and dumping the waste from city k in site i but also the imputed cost i t of depleting the extra space in site i. This imputed cost takes account of the net utility foregone in not using that marginal unit of space at another date | perhaps for a di erent city. Condition 4 also says that if the full marginal cost of city k using site i at date t strictly exceeds the marginal bene t, city k should not use that site q ik t = 0 at that date. Condition 5 is nothing but the Hotelling rule of nonrenewable resource exhaustion Hotelling, 1931 applied to each land ll site i, i = 1 ; : : : ; n . I t s a ys that the shadow v alue assigned to the marginal unit of land ll space remaining at the site must grow at the discount rate r.
The terminal conditions 6 and 7 serve to determine the optimal values of T and of the i T's. Condition 6 requires that the value of the Hamiltonian H | which measures the total surplus net of the opportunity cost of the land ll space being used | be zero at the terminal date T. If instead it were strictly positive, then the land ll depletion program could be improved upon by delaying somewhat the terminal date 6 . By substitution for the i T's from 4, one veri es that|since marginal cost is independent of the remaining land ll space and the utility functions are strictly concave|condition 6 implies that no land ll site be operating at a positive rate at the terminal date, i.e. q i T = 0 for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n . Condition 7 says that the value of the remaining land ll space must be zero at the terminal date T. Again, since marginal cost at any date t is independent of the remaining land ll space, this will require that all land lls be exhausted at the terminal date, with i T 0 being determined by the condition that S i T = 0 be satis ed.
Three basic results follow directly from conditions 4 and 5. First, it is never optimal for a city to use more than one site over any interval of time. For suppose city k were using simultaneously both site i and site j over some interval t 0 ending at time t. Since this means that q ik t 0 and q jk t 0 o v er that interval, conditions 4 and 5 imply that U 0 k q k t, c ik e ,rt = U 0 k q k t , t ,c ik e ,rt,t and U 0 k q k t ,c jk e ,rt = U 0 k q k t,t , c jk e ,rt,t . Subtracting the second of these equations from the rst, we nd that they imply c ik , c jk = c ik , c jk e rt . But this is impossible since, by assumption, r is positive and c ik 6 = c jk for all i 6 = j.
Second, amongst all the land ll sites that are already set up, each city will, at any given date, use only the one with lowest full marginal cost. This result follows since maximization of H at each t with respect to q ik t requires that, for each k, w e maximize
c ik + i t q ik t with respect to q ik t, subject to P n i=1 q ik t = q k t 0. This maximization can be achieved by rst maximizing H k over q ik t 0 subject to some speci ed q k t and then maximizing over all q k t 0: Given the linearity of the full total cost and the linearity of the constraint | which implies that the sites are perfect substitutes in use | the rst maximization always 6 Since we assume U 0 k 0 to be nite for all k = 1 ; : : : ; m , then T will necessarily be nite.
requires that for all t and for all k, q ik t be set to zero except for the one for which the full marginal cost, c ik + i t, is smallest amongst all the sites that are set up. Third, when a city switches from one land ll site to another, its land ll usage does not jump down. Indeed, as we h a v e just shown, if city k switches from land ll i to land ll j at some date , then it must be the case that c jk + j + c ik + i , . Otherwise, the city w ould be switching to a site with a strictly larger full marginal cost, in violation of the previous result. Intuitively, the planner would only assign a di erent land ll to a given city if one became available with a weakly cheaper full marginal cost. It follows from condition 4 that U 0 k q k + U 0 k q k , . By the concavity of the utility function, this means that
The solution to problem P2 will determine the optimal set-up dates for each land ll site. Let M i i f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; m gdenote the subset of cities that switch to land ll i when it is set-up at i and let hk 2 f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n g ,h k 6 =i , denote the land ll site used by city k just before switching to site i. Then the following conditions must be satis ed at i :
where G k q ik = U k q ik , U 0 k q ik q ik . Since when land ll i is used by city k, U 0 k q ik = c ik + i e rt , w e can rewrite this as G k q ik = U k q ik , c ik + i e rt q ik . Hence, it is the gross utility which city k obtains from using q ik units of space in site i net of the full cost including the imputed cost of shipping that much w aste to site i. 7 . Condition 8 is a rst-order condition. In the one-city case, it insures that usage will not jump in the absence of set-up costs as shown by Her ndahl 1967 and must jump up in the presence of set-up costs as shown by Hartwick, Kemp, and Long 1986 . In our multi-city generalization, the condition implies that it is optimal to delay setting up site i if the interest saved by postponing the set-up cost is strictly greater than the loss in net consumer surplus from having to use the old sites a little longer. In making this calculation, the planner must take i n to account the loss in consumer surplus at every city which w ould have switched to site i if it were opened at i :
Condition 9 is a second-order condition. Since G 0 k q ik = , U 00 k q ik q ik and, by the necessary conditions to problem P1, U 00 k q ik _ q ik = _ i = r i , this condition is best rewritten as
It says that the imputed value of the total land ll space used just after the switch to site i must be no greater than the total imputed value of that used just before the switch.
3 The case of no set-up costs
Assume the set-up costs are negligible at all the land ll sites F i = 0 8 . Before turning to the case of many cities and many sites, we rst consider brie y the simpler case of one city.
One city and many land ll sites with no set-up costs
The case where one city m a y ship to n land lls which h a v e already been set up corresponds to the well known basic problem solved by Her ndahl 1967: the city should completely draw d o wn the land ll space from low cost sites before moving on to higher cost ones. For no matter what path of usage is designated for the lone city, i t i s c heaper in present v alue terms to provide it by using all of a lower cost resource before using any of a higher cost resource. Thus when a switch occurs in the course of the optimal program, it must be to a site with a higher marginal cost. This can also be seen directly from the second-order 8 This is equivalent to assuming that all the sites have already been set-up.
condition 10. Suppose at date j the city w ere to switch from site i, with costs c ik , t o site j, with costs c jk c ik : Then from condition 4 and the fact that by 8 there is no discontinuity in usage q k + j = q k , j , we m ust have j j i j . But since only one site is used at any given date, this would violate the second-order condition 10. Hence, in the optimal program, the city m ust always switch to a land ll with a higher cost.
When there is only one city, it is immediate from condition 8 that if it switches from site i to site j at date j , then we m ust have q k + j = q k , j . In other words, if there are no set-up costs, there must be no discontinuity in the usage of land ll space when a change of site occurs. Hence there must be no discontinuity in the marginal utility or price, in a competitive equilibrium which decentralizes the optimal solution 9 . F rom conditions 4 and 5, usage will decrease continuously at a rate which will result in the shadow v alue of the marginal unit of land ll space growing at the rate of discount. Marginal utility or price hence follows a continuously increasing path, with kinks at the dates where switches in sites occur see Figure 1 . These kinks re ect the fact that, when switching from one land ll to another with the same full marginal cost but a higher marginal cost, the shadow v alue of the land ll adopted is lower than that of the one abandoned and the full marginal cost of the adopted site must therefore be growing more slowly.
Many cities and many land ll sites with no set-up costs
As mentioned in the introduction, Her ndhahl's results facilitate the incorporation of spatial considerations into the Hotelling model when there is a single user. Since at any given time, however, a land ll may be used by more than one city, a rst obvious direction of generalization of the Her ndahl framework consists in introducing many cities, arbitrarily distributed over space. Kolstad 1994 constitutes the only attempt at studying nonrenewable resource extraction when consumers of the resource are distributed over space. He considers a situation where two mines of potentially di erent size and di erent extraction costs are located at each end of a line segment with a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed over 9 In the absence of set-up costs, such a competitive equilibrium always exists. the line segment. The two mine operators are price takers 10 and the unit transport cost is an increasing function of distance. He derives the relationship that holds between the equilibrium rents at each mine and studies how the consumers will be partitioned between the two mines and how this partition will evolve o v er time, assuring that the two mines are eventually exhausted. Put in our framework, two land ll sites would serve many cities located on the line segment b e t w een them. Kolstad's framework is restrictive, because it does not allow for the cities to be distributed arbitrarily over space. Furthermore, the approach makes it very di cult to deal with the case of more than two land ll sites, since it requires that at every point in time the set of cities be partitioned between the sites. As we will see, redirecting the focus from the land ll sites to the cities using them permits any spatial con guration to be studied and facilitates the analysis of the case of many cities and many sites. It also allows an immediate comparison with the intuitive Her ndahl results.
Consider then the case of many cities and many land ll sites, both arbitrarily located in the plane. Assume every land ll has been set-up at the outset. We know that each city will at any given time use only the lowest full marginal cost site. Since a site which i s o f l o w est full marginal cost for one city will not necessarily be of lowest full marginal cost for other cities, it will generally be observed, in contrast to the case of one city, that many sites are being used at the same time. Clearly, Her ndahl's result does not generalize in this particular way. H o w ever, it does generalize if one focuses on individual cities. It remains true, as shown previously, that no city will use more than one site at the same time. Moreover, it remains true that each city will use land lls in the order of their marginal costs: if city k switches from site j to site i, i t m ust be that c ik c jk 11 . In the absence of set-up costs, one can in fact devise a straightforward algorithm to solve the entire set of rst-order conditions associated 10 He also considers a situation where one is a monopolist and the other is a price taker, but the presence of imperfect competition raises issues which are beyond the scope of the present paper.
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The proof is exactly the same as that made above in the one-city case. Again, since this implies that j t i t at the switch date and since, with F i = 0, condition 8 implies that q ik + i = q h k k , i = q k i , the second-order condition 10 is satis ed.
with the planning problem 12 . Since this problem is concave, solution of these conditions su ces to identify the optimum when | in the absence of set-up costs | multiple land lls serve m ultiple cities at arbitrary locations. Note that although in the optimal program no city uses more than one site at the same time, it is quite possible that many cities will simultaneously use the same site.
A fundamental di erence with the one-city case and the Her ndahl principle based on that case may h o w ever arise in the multiple city case. This is that a city may now very well be using some land ll site while a lower cost one is still available and being used by one or more other cities. The reason is that the imputed value of a unit of space at site i, i , will now depend not only on that city's cost and demand parameters, but on those of other cities as well. Hence, although city k will always use only the land ll site for which c ik + i t i s smallest, this does not necessarily correspond to the one with the lowest c ik available to it at time t.
To see this, consider the following example. Suppose there are two cities city A and city B and two land ll sites. Assume that, for k = A; B, c jk c ik . Assume further that c jB ,c iB c jA ,c iA so that, although i j , w e h a v e c jB + j c jA + j c iB + i c iA + i .
The situation is depicted in Figure 2 . For both cities, the cost of transporting and dumping a unit of waste to land ll site i is lower than to land ll site j. H o w ever it costs less for city A to switch from site i to site j. Initially, the full marginal cost of using site i is lower than that of using site j for both cities. So both cities are using site i at rst. At t A , c iA + i e rt A = c jA + j e rt A 11 12
The simulation model in Ley, Macauley, and Salant 1997 uses such an algorithm. The algorithm proceeds as follows: 1 assign to each land ll an initial multiplier and let each m ultiplier subsequently grow at the exogenous rate of interest; 2 for each o f t h e m cities, assemble the set of the n full marginal costs available at each date and assign to that city at that date the land ll with the smallest full marginal cost; 3 assume that each city uses the designated land ll to the point where the marginal bene t from additional usage equals the full marginal cost; 4 determine the cumulative usage of each land ll over time and across cities and compare the cumulative usage to the initial size of each land ll; 5 if, for each land ll, cumulative usage exactly matches the initial stock, then the optimum has been identi ed; 6 otherwise, the multipliers must be revised and the process repeated. and city A begins shipping its waste to site j instead of site i. A t t B t A , c iB + i e rt B = c jB + j e rt B ; 12 site i is completely lled up, and city B begins using site j. Therefore, for t 2 t A ; t B , city A is using land ll site j while space remains in site i and c iA c jA .
Given the results in the one-city case, one might expect that costs could be lowered if city A were to transfer some of its waste from site j to site i. Indeed, transferring a unit of waste from site j to site i at t 2 t A ; t B results in a cost saving of e ,rt c jA ,c iA 0. But since site j will be lled up by city B at t B , this transfer must be o set by a similar transfer from site i to site j by city B at some date t + t 2 t; t B . This last transfer will result in a cost increase of e ,rt+t c jB ,c iB . Hence, the total change in cost, in present v alue terms, is e ,rt c jA ,c iA , e ,rt c jB ,c iB = e ,rt e rt B ,t ,e rt A i , j 0; where the cost di erences in the rst line have been replaced in the second line by di erences in shadow v alues appropriately discounted using conditions 11 and 12. Therefore the program cannot be improved upon by such a transfer and it is indeed optimal for city A to switch to the higher cost land ll site j before the lower cost site i is lled up.
Nonetheless, it will never be the case, in this situation, that a city w ould come back a t a later date to the site it had abandoned. For this would mean switching to a low marginal cost site from a high marginal cost one, which has been shown not to be optimal in the absence of set-up costs. 4 The case of set-up costs
The costs which m ust be incurred in setting up land ll sites before they can be used are at times substantial and, despite the analytical complexity i n v olved, it is important that they be taken into consideration. We therefore turn now to the analysis of the intertemporal and spatial allocation of land ll sites with set-up costs. We brie y review some known results for the one-city case before turning to the more general case of many cities.
One city and many land ll sites with set-up costs
The conclusions of Hartwick, Kemp and Long 1986 apply immediately to the land ll problem with one city and many land ll sites. As in the case without set-up costs, the city m ust exploit the land ll sites in strict sequence: each site must be exhausted before going on to the next. However, unlike the case without set-up costs, sites need not be exploited in order of their marginal costs; it may be optimal, for example, to postpone usage of a site with the lowest marginal cost if opening it involves relatively high set-up costs. It is easy to see that opening lls in order of their marginal costs is no longer necessary for an optimum in the presence of set-up costs. For suppose the lone city is city k and that it switches at j from site i to site j, which requires that a set-up cost of F j 0 be incurred at that date. Then, remembering that it never uses more than one site, we deduce from the rst-order condition 8, which m ust hold at j , that q jk + j q ik , j : the city's land ll usage jumps up. The second-order condition 9, which m ust also hold at j , can be written Since the right-hand side is strictly positive, so must be the left-hand side, and hence i , j j + j . Now the city's land ll usage path must also satisfy, a t a l l t , the rstorder condition 4, and, as a result, c jk + j + j c ik + i , j :
This does not require c jk c ik 13 .
Many cities and many land ll sites with set-up costs
In the case of many cities and many land lls sites with set-up costs, the three basic results established earlier still hold: each city never uses more than one site at any given time, always uses the one with the lowest full marginal cost amongst all those that are set-up and never reduces its usage when it switches sites. But they admit a very remarkable possibility as well. Not only can it be optimal for a city to exploit a high marginal cost site before a low marginal cost one | because of the presence of xed costs | or to abandon a low marginal cost site in favor of a higher cost one while the low cost one is still available | because there are other cities using the sites whose behavior has an impact on their full marginal cost | but a city may well abandon a site and come back to it at a later date. In optimizing, the planner may t h us appear to vacillate. Clearly, this requires that the city switch from a higher cost site to a lower one when it abandons the site originally and then from a lower cost site to a higher cost site when it resumes shipping to the abandoned site. This can never happen in the case of a single city with or without set-up costs since in all such cases a land ll must be fully depleted before it is abandoned and there can be no point in returning to it. Nor can this ever occur with multiple cities in the absence of set-up costs. For, while it is possible for a city to switch to a higher cost site while a lower cost site is still available, it is never optimal to return to the low cost site since transitions for any given city m ust always be to sites with higher marginal costs. The possibility requires both multiple cities and set-up costs. As we h a v e discussed, when there are multiple cities it is sometimes optimal for a city to abandon a site even though that site is not fully depleted. When there are also set-up costs, the site which that city abandons may be a high cost site which has been exploited before a low cost one has been set-up. Once the lower cost site is set up, however, the city m ust switch t o i t 13 Recall that in the one-city case with no set-up cost, the rst-order condition 4 implies c jk + j j = c ik + i j , which requires c jk c ik , since i j j j b y condition 10.
since it would be, among the sites set up, the one with the lowest full marginal cost. Once that site is exhausted, however, a return by that city to the abandoned land ll would be a standard transition to a site of higher marginal cost.
This counterintuitive result is best understood with the help of an example. Assume there are two cities cities A and B and three land ll sites sites 1,2,3. For the sake o f the discussion, we m a y assume that the cost of transporting a unit of waste to a particular land ll is strictly proportional to the distance from the city to the site and that, other than the set-up cost, this is the only cost. Assume that sites 1 and 2 have no set-up cost F 2 = F 1 = 0 but that site 3 has a very large set-up cost F 3 0. Site 2 is small, whereas sites 1 and 3 are larger. Site 1 is closer to city A than it is to city B c 1A c 1 B and it is closer to city A than is site 2 c 1A c 2 A . Site 3 is located at city A c 3A = 0, while city B is equidistant from sites 2 and 3 c 2B = c 3B . The location of the cities and the land ll sites might be as depicted in The resulting time paths of marginal utility at each city are depicted in Figure 4 . Given the fact that sites 1 and 2 are already set-up and that site 3 has a very large set-up cost, at rst city A uses site 1 and city B uses site 2. Site 2 is relatively small and is exhausted by city B at some date 3 , while site 1 still has some space left. However, because the cost of transporting the waste from city B to site 1 is very high, it becomes optimal to set-up site 3, even though this means incurring a set-up cost of F 3 . Once setup, it becomes advantageous to have city A switch to site 3 as well, since the full marginal cost of site 3 to city A is smaller than that of site 1 c 1A + 1 3 c 3 A + 3 3 . Because 3 t and 1 t both grow at the same constant rate and 3 1 , c 3 A + 3 t will eventually cross c 1A + 1 t from below at, say, date t 0 . It therefore becomes optimal for city A to return to site 1 at t 0 , since beyond that date c 1A + 1 t c 3 A + 3 t . Along each path just described, the land ll usage is given by equalizing marginal utility at each city to the full marginal cost of the site being used, calculated using the shadow values picked initially. The necessary condition 4 is therefore satis ed. So is the necessary condition 5, by h a ving the shadow v alues grow at the same constant rate of discount. The switching date 3 is chosen to satisfy the necessary condition 8. As for the second-order condition 10, which requires that the imputed value of the total land ll space used not jump up when a switch occurs, it may be written Notice that although it constrains the i 's, the fact that 3 + 3 , 1 , 3 0 and 3 + 3 , 2 , 3 0 does not prevent the condition from being satis ed. Hence, it is possible to set the multipliers and F 3 so that the necessary conditions are all satis ed and then to choose initial stocks so that the usages required in this example are exactly available.
The comparative dynamics of transport costs
In a context where there are many land ll sites serving many cities, a change in transport cost can have e ects which cannot be observed in the simple one-city case. When only one city is being served by one or more land ll sites, it is clear that an increase in the cost of transporting the waste to the sites must always have the e ect of decreasing the shadow value of land ll space. But when there are many cities being served by the same sites, an increase in the transport cost may in fact reduce the shadow v alue of land ll space at one site and raise it at another site. As a consequence, we m a y observe the counterintuitive result that the full marginal cost to some cities goes up while that to some other cities goes down. To illustrate this, consider the following example.
Suppose there are two land ll sites sites 1 and 2 from which to supply land ll space to three cities cities A, B and C. Site 1 is of initial size S 0 1 and site 2 of initial size S 0 2 . Assume the only costs are transport costs and that these are proportional to the distance between the city and the site. Thus if c is the transport cost per unit of distance and d ik is the distance between city k and site i, w e can write c ik = cd ik . W e will assume d 1A d 2 A , city A being located close to site 1 and far from site 2, while d 2B d 1 B , city B being located close to site 2 but far from site 1. City C on the other hand is located at site 2 d 2C = 0 and a long distance from site 1 d 1C 0.
Assume that the utility function at city k is given by
This means that when cd ik + i e rt c d jk + j e rt , i 6 = j, i; j = 1 ; 2, the Hamiltonian will be W e will assume that city A values waste disposal less than it costs to transport the waste to site 2 cd 2A v A and city C values it less than it costs to transport it to site 1 cd 1C v h . Therefore it will never be optimal for city A to use site 2, nor for city C to use site 1.
This means that, provided cd 1A + 1 v A , city A will be using site 1 at date t = 0 and will continue to do so without switching until some date T A , given by cd 1A + 1 e rT A = v A : 13
14
In a decentralized pricing system, this utility function would generate a rectangular" demand, the quantity demanded in market k being q k for any price smaller than v k , zero for any price higher than v k and some indeterminate quantity b e t w een zero and q k for a price exactly equal to v k .
At date T A , its land ll usage drops to zero. Similarly, provided 2 v C , city C will be using site 2 at date t = 0 and will stick t o i t until some date T C , given by 2 e rT C = v C : 14
At T C , city C's land ll usage also falls to zero .
As for city B, if in equilibrium we had 2 1 , then it would be using only site 2, since by assumption d 2B d 1 B and both shadow prices are growing at the same rate. On the other hand, if 2 1 and cd 1B + 1 cd 2B + 2 , w e w ould necessarily have cd 2B + 2 e rt cd 1B + 1 e rt for all t 0 and it would be using only site 1 for all t 0. We will hereafter restrict attention to the more interesting case where 2 1 , but cd 1B + 1 c d 2 B + 2 .
In that case, city B will be using site 2 initially and will switch to site 1 at some date t B S 0 2 = q B , which m ust satisfy 15 cd 2B + 2 e rt B = cd 1B + 1 e rt B : 15
Having switched to site 1 at t B , city B will use it until it reaches the terminal date T B , which must satisfy cd 1B + 1 e rT B = v B : 16
In order for these land ll consumption paths to be feasible, the total required land ll space must not exceed that which i s a v ailable at the two sites. 0. The underlying intuition for this result can be summarized as follows. For the values of the parameters generating the result, an increase in the unit cost of transporting waste would cause city B to delay switching to the more distant site: dt B dc 0. If that site's tipping fee 1 did not fall to induce additional usage by city A then site 1 would be underutilized. As for site 2, which n o w has more usage from city B , i t w ould be overutilized if its tipping fee 2 did not rise. Therefore, the tipping fee paid by city A 1 will fall while that paid by city C 2 will rise.
The non linearity of the six-equation system 16 makes it impossible to get a closed form solution which w ould make it possible to directly verify this result. However, if we totally di erentiate the system of equations and let We therefore see immediately that an increase in the transport cost reduces the equilibrium shadow v alue of a unit of land ll space at site 1. As for the e ect of the transport cost 16 Taking logarithms, we nd that ln 2 , 1 appears in equation 15. on 2 , w e see from 20 that it is of the same sign as the e ect on t B , given by 21 17 Clearly there exist admissible values of the parameters for which bothṽ C andS 0 1 are positive. If we n o w set v C = v C and S 0 1 =S 0 1 in equations 14 and 18 and revert to treating 2 and 1 as variables, the solution to the original system of equations 13 to 18 for 2 and 1 , with those speci c values of the parameters, must be 2 = 1 and 1 = 1 = . Therefore, for any v alue of K + 1 , w e h a v e dt B =dc 0 and hence d 2 =dc 0. Note that the equilibrium values of the remaining variables are easily calculated as well, but are of no direct interest for our purposes.
We h a v e therefore established that in some cases an increase in the unit transport cost will raise the shadow v alue of land ll space at site 2 while it lowers it at site 1. This is because, in those cases, the increase in the transport cost creates an incentive t o h a v e city B switch from site 2 to site 1 at a later date than it otherwise would. This in turn requires that city B be allocated more of the limited space available at site 2 and less of that available at 17 Equation 20 follows immediately from equations 14 and 16. site 1.
As a direct result, the full marginal cost of land ll space necessarily goes up at city C, since the opportunity cost 2 is the only cost to city C using site 2. As for the full marginal cost of land ll space to city A, it falls if d 1A is not too large for instance, if d 1A = 0. This means that in a decentralized competitive equilibrium, the increase in the per unit cost of transporting waste would have the paradoxical e ect of increasing the delivered price" of land ll space at city C and decreasing it at city A, the delivered price being equal to the marginal cost of transporting the waste to the site plus the tipping fee at that site 18 .
Reinterpretations
To this point, we h a v e assumed that user k's utility a t t is a strictly increasing function of the exhaustible resources used then. This formulation seems entirely appropriate for applications to conventional exhaustible resources. However, it may at rst seem inapplicable when the exhaustible resource is instead unused land ll space. After all, one tends to think of a city as generating waste at a xed rate and having no choice but to dispose of it. In fact, cities need not land ll all their waste. At a cost, they can engage in waste reduction, recycling, or incineration. As shown below, no changes need be made in our model to incorporate any o f these features of the real-world problem.
Recycling can be accommodated within our model by reinterpreting the utility function. Assume the waste stream of city k denoted w k cannot be reduced. Instead it must be either 1 recycled or 2 land lled somewhere. Denote the total cost of recycling at rate z as C R z, where this function is strictly increasing and strictly convex with C R 0 = 0. Then we can interpret U k q k t as the recycling costs saved by land lling at rate q k t so that 18 In the example, the full marginal cost to city B | hence the delivered price in a market solution | goes up at both sites. This is obvious for site 2, since both 2 and c have gone up. It must also be the case at site 1 even though 1 has gone down, for otherwise city B would have switched to site 1 earlier, not later i.e., t B would have gone down, not up. recycling occurs at the reduced rate w k , q k t: U k q k t = C R w k , C R w k , q k t:
Note that the foregoing utility function satis es the properties assumed throughout: it is strictly increasing, strictly concave, passes through the origin and has a nite rst derivative at zero. When city k uses land ll i; the necessary condition U 0 k q k t = c ik + i t implies C 0 R w k , q k t = c ik + i t. Hence, the planner recycles city k's waste to the point where the marginal cost of recycling additional waste equals the full marginal cost of land lling it at the least costly of the n sites.
A similar reinterpretation of the utility function permits incorporation of waste reduction as well. Assume that the potential waste stream of city k denoted w k can at a cost be reduced by x k t so that the amount which m ust be recycled or land lled at t is only w k , x k t. Denote the total cost of waste reduction at rate x k t a s C D x k t , where this function is strictly increasing and strictly convex with C D 0 = 0: Then we can interpret U k q k t as the costs saved by land lling city k's waste at rate q k t so that the amount of waste reduction and recycling is reduced to w k , q k t :
where x k t is the optimal amount o f w aste reduction if nothing is land lled. Let x k q k t; t denote the unique maximizer at date t; therefore, x k t = x k 0; t :Note that this utility function also satis es the properties we h a v e assumed throughout 19 . If the planner disposes of city k's waste at land ll i at time t, U 0 k q k t = c ik + i t. Hence, C 0 R w k ,x k q k t; t , q k t = c ik + i t. At the margin, the cost of further recycling is again equal to the cost of additional land lling. But since x k q k t; t is set optimally, the marginal cost of recycling 19 U k 0 = 0; U 0 k q k t = C 0 R w k , x k q k t; t ,q k t 0; U 00 k q k t = ,C 00 R w k , x k q k t; t , q k t 1 + dxk dq k 0: Hence, as before, this new utility function is also strictly increasing, strictly concave, and passes through the origin. In addition, U 0 k 0 = C 0 R w k , x k t is nite.
is also equal to the marginal cost of waste reduction: C 0 R w k , x k q k t; t ,q k t = C 0 D x k q k t; t . Hence the marginal cost of land lling, recycling, and waste reduction are equated whenever it is optimal at time t for city k to use all three of these activities at strictly positive rates to dispose of its waste.
Cities can, of course, also incinerate their waste. No change in the model is necessary to accommodate this feature of the solid waste problem. Incinerators can simply be regarded as land lls with extremely large or in nite initial stocks. That is, incineration can be regarded as a spatially located backstop."
Since the initial reserves of a mine are xed while land lls can in fact be expanded at a cost, our formulation may again seem more applicable to conventional resources than to solid waste disposal. To at least some extent, capacity expansion can also be accommodated without changing our model. Capacity expansion is typically lumpy" in the sense that the cost of opening a space of standard size is the same as the cost of opening anything smaller. In that case, one can simply regard the expansion of the existing land ll as the opening of a second land ll with initial capacity re ecting the lumpiness" adjacent to the rst.
Since mines can only be located near mineral deposits, while land lls and incinerators can be located virtually anywhere," our formulation may again seem at rst more applicable to extraction of conventional resources than to solid waste disposal. However, with suitable interpretations, our model captures this aspect of the solid waste problem as well. Let n be the number of potential sites of a land ll or incinerator. As long as n is nite, our model applies. The planner can then be viewed as choosing which subset of a possibly large but nite set of potential sites to develop.
Conclusion
We h a v e generalized the standard model of nonrenewable resource depletion to the common situation where reserves and users are located arbitrarily over space. We h a v e shown how the received results in the literature following Her ndahl 1967 can be given a spatial reinterpretation where a single user is regarded as exploiting many deposits at arbitrarily speci ed locations. From this perspective, the contribution of our paper is to generalize these spatial results further to the common case where there are also multiple, spatially distributed users. As we h a v e shown, a variety of new phenomena arise. It may be socially optimal, for example, for some land ll users to abandon a nearby land ll in preference for a more distant one even though space remains in the nearby ll and other users continue to exploit it. Moreover, in the presence of set-up costs, it may be socially optimal for every city patronizing a particular land ll to abandon it even though space remains | and then for some users to return to it after a delay. Finally, in a decentralized competitive equilibrium, increases in the transport cost may cause some land ll prices to rise while others fall. In addition to providing new insights into the spatial and intertemporal allocation of scarce resources, our model also constitutes a useful framework for analyzing policies aimed at regulating the spatial allocation of a scarce resource such as land ll space. To that end, a n umber of natural extensions of the model can easily be envisioned. The introduction of investment in new capacity w ould allow for the possibility of scarce land ll space to be increased either by the expansion of existing sites or the creation of new ones. This is the counterpart of investing in discovery and development in the case of minerals and oil. Another useful extension would be to take i n to account the value of alternative uses of each site in order to determine the initial allocation of land between land lls and other uses. This would, in e ect, endogenize the initial space allocated to each land ll S 0 i and perhaps the setup cost itself F i . These extensions, which w ould permit a still more accurate characterization of the real-world solid-waste situation, would rely heavily on the analysis presented here; but we leave them for future work.
